Bombmaker Ibrahim Hasan al-Asiri

The news channels are touting the Central Intelligence Agency’s recent success in penetrating al-Qa’idah in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and preventing a potential devastating attack on a commercial passenger flight bound for the United States.

An agency asset was not only able to stop a bomb plot but fingered one of the key planners of the operation. That is what led to last Sunday’s (May 6) drone-launched missile attack on Fahd al-Qus’u. (See my article on that operation, Wanted Al-Qa’idah leader killed in Yemen.)

This represents stellar work by the American intelligence service and good news in the war on terrorism - I assume that war is still going on despite Obama Administration claims to the contrary.

A disclaimer before I continue - I was a case officer trained by the CIA. Having done this for a living, I know first hand the danger and difficulty in working against these terrorist organizations. This operation shows that it can be done.

Regardless of the criticisms levied against the CIA and overall U.S. intelligence community, American intelligence services remain among the best trained, best-equipped, focused and operationally capable organizations in the world. If there is any doubt, captured documents from Usamah bin Ladin’s Abbottabad compound reveal a respect for the decimation of the al-Qa’idah organization at American hands.

This operation is just another success story. My concern - why are we reading about it in such detail? This is similar to the “data dump” of operational details that followed the raid that killed bin Ladin a year ago. Rather than “spiking the football in the end zone” again, perhaps a little reticence would have better served the greater good.

This is not the first time we have unwittingly assisted our enemies through our zeal to tout our successes. When so-called “underwear bomber” Nigerian-born ‘Umar Faruq ‘Abd al-Mutalib failed to detonate a bomb secreted in his underwear aboard a Detroit-bound airliner on Christmas Day, 2009, the Obama Administration chose to release specific information about why the device malfunctioned.

That device used the explosive compound PETN, the major ingredient of Semtex - the terrorists’ preferred plastic explosive. The amount was more than enough required to destroy an airliner in flight. However, the acid-based detonator was not powerful enough to ignite the PETN which had gotten damp from perspiration during the flight.

PETN requires the use of a strong detonator and dry PETN. I have lit Semtex with a match (don’t ask) - it burns very hot but does not explode. In effect, by releasing such details, we told al-Qa’idah’s principal bomb maker, Saudi national Ibrahim Hasan al-Asiri, how to correct his design flaws. I hope we are not going to release similar details of the second generation bomb acquired by the CIA asset.

Then there are problems created by openly acknowledging that the would-be bomber was a CIA asset. Now AQAP is certain that they had been penetrated. A better way to handle this would have been to stop the operation in a way that preserved the secrecy of that critical fact.

It would have been far better to have a security service or airport screener “discover” the bomb and make an arrest. AQAP might then have believed that their “bomber” was simply caught and that their bomb design was subject to detection by current screening techniques and scanners. Maybe they would suspect that their bomber was a double agent but they could not be certain, Instead, we have eliminated that uncertainty and called into question our ability to detect this type of explosive device.

In the end, AQAP or another al-Qa’idah affiliate will attempt another attack, most likely using this type of device. The best defense we have against this is to continue the excellent intelligence work as was done in this penetration of the terrorist, identify key leaders and operations personnel, kill them before they can mount an attack, and then not release operational details about it.

I applaud the CIA’s intelligence efforts on this case and I applaud the President’s decision to expand the use of drone-launched missile attacks on al-Qa’idah operatives. However, the Administration needs to remember that when it publicly acknowledges these victories and reveals significant operational details, it only helps al-Qa’idah refine its offensive capabilities.

When White House officials such as counter-terrorism John Brennan make arrogant statements like, “We had confidence that we had control, that that [bomb] was not a threat, was not an active threat at that time,” it only aids al-Qa’idah - it does not make us safer.

Stop talking.

FBI Wanted Poster - Fahd al-Qus’u - ÙÙ‡Ø¯ القصع

Message to terrorists who kill American service members, diplomats and citizens: It may take years, even a decade or more, but the military and intelligence services of the United States will hunt you down and kill you.

In Yemen on Sunday, May 6, an airstrike killed wanted al-Qa’idah leader Fahd Muhammad Ahmad al-Qus’u (also rendered as al-Quso). Al-Qus’u was one on the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted Terrorists for his role in the October 12, 2000 attack on the USS Cole while in the port of Aden, Yemen, in which 17 American sailors were killed.

Although neither the Yemenis nor the Americans have confirmed that the strike was carried out by an American drone, Al Jazeera reported it as an American attack which killed al-Qus’u and an accompanying al-Qa’idah official, as well as wounding six others. This has all the indicators of an attack by a drone-launched Hellfire missile. Of note, the report in Arabic on Al Jazeera stated that al-Qus’u had been “martyred” - any question who’s side they are on?

Al-Qus’u had been assigned by al-Qa’idah to videotape the 1998 suicide bombing of the USS Cole, but he fell asleep. To their credit, the Yemenis arrested him and imprisoned him for more than five years. Following his release in 2007, he rejoined al-Qa’idah and became a much more influential member of the organization.

Being from the same tribe as the late (as in also killed by an American missile strike) American-born radical cleric and al-Qa’idah leader Anwar al-’Awlaqi, al-Qus’u was involved in plot by Nigerian-born ‘Umar Faruq ‘Abd al-Mutalib to bomb a Detroit-bound airliner on Christmas Day, 2009. In 2010, he achieved what is considered a benchmark for al-Qa’idah leaders: the U.S. State Department designated him as a “global terrorist.”

I have been critical of many aspects of President Obama’s foreign policy in the Middle East in general and his prosecution of the wars there in particular. His “leading from behind” style and the constant telegraphing of our plans and strategies to our antagonists is dangerous. That said, his willingness to order drone-launched missile strikes on al-Qa’idah terrorists in Pakistan and Yemen is to be lauded.

Hunting down al-Qa’idah leaders in the countries where they have sought refuge is much preferable and more effective than nation building efforts in countries in which al-Qa’idah is no longer a threat.

Syrian chemical munitions manufacturing facility at al-Safir

Despite Kofi Annan’s wishful thanking that his cease-fire plan is “on track,” the security situation in Syria continues to deteriorate. Many of the world’s major powers, including the United States, have called for Syrian President Bashar al-Asad to step down.

As this process plays out, there is concern about what might happen to Syria’s large stockpile of chemical weapons stored in several locations around the country. The worst case scenario, of course, is that these weapons end up in the hands of a non-state actor such as Hizballah or al-Qa’idah.

Technically, Syria is within its rights to have chemical weapons. The country is a signatory of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits first use of chemical or biological weapons, but does not prohibit the manufacture or possession of them.

More significantly, Syria is not a signatory of the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention which goes further and does outlaw the production, stockpiling and any - not just “first” - use of chemical munitions. As such, Syria is under no international obligation to declare its chemical weapons, destroy them or even allow international inspectors to monitor them. By not signing the convention, Syria is in company with only Angola, North Korea, Egypt, Somalia and South Sudan.

Syria has not admitted that it possesses chemical weapons, but it is hardly a secret. It is believed to have the largest stockpile of undeclared chemical weapons in the world, including the most lethal chemical warfare agent ever developed, the persistent nerve agent VX.

The Director of National Intelligence, in an unclassified report to Congress in 2006, provided this assessment of Syria’s chemical and biological weapons, and the ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver them. It does not address Syrian air force fighter-bombers that can also carry chemical weapons.
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Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January to 31 December 2006. (Read the entire report).

UNCLASSIFIED
Chemical and Biological. Syria continued to seek dual-use technology from foreign sources during the reporting period. Syria has had a chemical weapons program for many years and already has a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin, which can be delivered by aircraft or ballistic missile. In addition, Syria is developing the more toxic and persistent nerve agent VX. We assess that Syria remains dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its CW program, including precursor chemicals.

Syria’s biotechnical infrastructure is capable of supporting limited biological agent development. We do not assess the Syrians have achieved a capability to put biological agents into effective weapons, however.

Ballistic Missile. Syria’s ballistic missile program is a key component to its strategy to deter external threats and is a priority in defense planning and spending. Syria possesses one of the largest ballistic missile forces in the Middle East—composed of Scud-class liquid propellant short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), including Soviet—and North Korean—origin Scud missiles. Additionally, Syria fields the SS-21 Mod 2 SRBM. We judge that Syria’s operational missile force can employ chemical as well as conventional warheads. Syria is developing a version of its Scud-D missile with greater accuracy and that is more difficult to intercept.
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Syria maintains its chemical weapons arsenal and delivery systems to provide a deterrent against an attack by the vastly-superior (and nuclear-equipped) Israeli armed forces. Its ballistic missiles and squadron of SU-24 (NATO: FENCER) fighter-bombers can deliver chemical weapons virtually anywhere in Israel.

That fact mitigates Israel’s oft-cited argument that it needs to retain control of the Golan Heights seized from Syria in the Six Day War of 1967. Syrian artillery positions on the heights at one time posed a threat to northern Israel, but with the advances in weapons technology, the Syrians no longer need the high ground to put weapons on Israeli targets. Syrian missiles based in protected launch positions in northern Syria can strike targets anywhere in Israel.

Syria’s chemical weapons are - and should be - of concern. As the world determines its next steps in confronting the bloodbath in Syria, it needs to take into consideration the status and disposition of Syria’s chemical munitions. Although handling of the weapons requires specialized training, having them fall into the hands of Hizballah via the Syrian regime, or into the hands of al-Qa’idah via the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated opposition, is a frightening thought.